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Abstract
Mauritius belongs  to a select group of developing  unfunded civil service scheme,  occupational pension
countries where contractual  savings-savings with  schemes cover about  100,000 employees or 20 percent
insurance companies  and pension funds-exceed 40  of the labor force.
percent of GDP and represent  a major potential force in  All types of pension  funds, including the public ones,
the local financial  system. Pension funlds account  for 75  report low operating  costs. This reflects  the absence  of
percent of contractual savings.  marketing and  selling costs  and, in the case of large
Contractual  savings institutions  invest in government  private pension  funds, the  assumption of some costs by
securities,  housing loans, corporate  securities,  real estate  sponsoring employers.
and bank  deposits. They currently hold 35 percent of  The  investment performance  of the self-administered
government securities and also account  for 36 percent  of  funds was less than fully satisfactory  in the late  1990s,
total outstanding  housing loans.  reflecting poor  returns on the  local  and foreign equity
Given their strong demand for long-duration assets,  markets.  Funds insured  or administered  by insurance
they can  stimulate the  issue of long-term  government  companies  as well the NPF performed  better during this
bonds (both  inflation-linked  and zero-coupon)  anic  the  period because of their heavier  allocations  in government
development of corporate debentures,  mortgage bonds,  securities and housing  loans.  However,  over a longer
and mortgage-backed  securities.  period, the private pension  funds probably outperformed
Mauritius  has a balanced and well-managed  multipillar  the NPF.
pension system.  In addition to several public  The regulatory  framework, though fragmented, is not
components, such as the Basic Retirement Pension,  the  unreasonable.  It has many important provisions, such as
National Pensions Fund (NPF), the National Savings  observance  of internationally  acceptable  accounting and
Fund, and the  Civil Service Pension  Scheme, there are  actuarial  standards and minimum vesting and portability
over 1,000 funded occupational  pension  schemes that  rules,  and it does not impose prescribed  limits on
play an  increasingly important part in the whole  system.  investments.
The funded schemes are divided  into two main  However,  consolidation and modernization  of the
groups-those  insured and/or administered  by insurance  regulatory framework  is required,  while supervision,
companies,  and those  that are self-administered  and are  which is currently  nonexistent, needs  to be developed
registered with the Registrar of Associations.  and to be proactive.
Coverage  of the funded schemes  is estimated  at about
10 percent of the labor force. Together  with the
This  paper-a  product  of  the  Financial  Sector  Operations  and  Policy  Departrrient-is  part of  a larger  effort  in  the
department  to study pension funds and contractual  savings. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Priscilla Infante, room MC9-904,  telephone 202-473-7642,
fax 202-522-7105,  email  address pinfante@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web
at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at dvittas@worldbank.org.  April 2003.  (34 pages)
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Mauritius, a small island economy in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Africa,  has
been  remarkably  successful  in  achieving  rapid  economic  growth  in  the  context  of
financial  and  political  stability.  It  has  been  able  to  overcome  unfavorable  initial
conditions  and exposure  to economic  sectors  that  suffered  from  cyclical  and  structural
weaknesses.  This  success  has  been  attributed  to  the  pursuit  of stable  macroeconomic
policies  and  the  promotion  of  sound  and efficient  institutions.  The  importance  of the
latter in explaining  the strong growth  performance  of Mauritius  has been highlighted  in
Subramanian  and Roy (2001).
These policies have benefited many sectors of the economy, including the
financial sector. They have stimulated the growth of banks as well as insurance
companies and pension funds.  In the pensions area, they are underscored by the creation
of a well-designed multi-pillar pension system that comprises  several public components,
such as the Basic Retirement Pension, the National  Pensions Fund, the National Savings
Fund, and the Civil Service Pension Scheme, alongside a large number of occupational
pension schemes.
This paper provides an overview of the development and role of occupational
pension schemes in Mauritius.  The main focus is on the funded schemes that have been
set up by private companies and statutory bodies. However, to provide a broader context
of their role and relative importance,  the paper also offers a brief overview  of the
contractual  savings market and the public provision of pensions.  The various components
of public provision are discussed at greater length in the Annex. The paper draws
extensively on, and also complements, the recently completed World Bank study (World
Bank 2001)  and its background papers (Demarco 2000, Piggott and Whitehouse  2000,
Rofman 2000,  and Sin 2000).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following this introductory section,
section II provides a brief summary of the contractual  savings market. This is followed
by section Im  that covers the institutional structure of the pension system,  subdivided into
non-occupational  and occupational pension schemes. Section IV analyzes  the investment
and operating performance of different types of funds, while section V reviews the
regulation  and supervision  of pension funds with particular emphasis  on existing gaps
and areas requiring strengthening.  Section VI offers a brief evaluation of the-performance
of company pension funds against a set of economic criteria and then reviews their future
prospects  and main policy issues. The Annex offers a more detailed discussion of the
various components  of public provision of pensions.
II.  The Contractual Savings Market
Mauntius belongs to a select group of developing countries  where contractual
savings (i.e., savings  with insurance  companies and pension funds) exceed 40'percent of
GDP and represent a major potential force in the local financial system. Occupational
1pension funds, including those insured and/or administered by insurance companies,
represent 75 percent of contractual  savings.
Other developing countries with large contractual savings sectors include  South
Africa, Malaysia and Chile alongside most high income countries and some island
economies like Cyprus and Malta. The vast majority of developing countries  in Africa,
Asia and Latin America as well as most transition countries of Eastern Europe  are well
below this level.
Table 1: Assets of Contractual Savings ]Institutions, 1997-2001
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
(MUR million)
Registered Pension Funds  1704  2095  2368  2720  2959
Sugar Industry Pension Funds  1180  1750  2005  2500  2196
Insured and Administered*"  5502  6460  7210  8120  8904
Total Occupational Pension Funds  8386  10305  11583  13340  14059
NPF  12174  14266  16464  18899  21772
NSF  948  1366  1825  2385  2849
Insurance Companies  14130  16672  19200  21123  23971
Total  35638  42609  49072  55747  62651
Less Double Countng**  5502  6460  7210  8120  8904
Contractual Savings  Assets  30136  36149  41862  47627  53747
(percent of GDP)
Registered Pension Funds  1.93  2.10  2.21  2.30  2.25
Sugar Industry Pension Funds  1.34  1.75  1.87  2.11  1.67
Insured & Administered**  6.23  6.47  6.72  6.85  6.77
Total Occupational Pension Funds  9.50  10.32  10.80  11.26  10.69
NPF  13.78  14.28  15.33  15.95  16.56
NSF  1.07  1.37  1.70  2.01  2.17
Insurance  Companies  15.99  16.69  17.88  17.83  18.23
Total  40.34  42.66  45.71  47.05  47.65
Less Double Counting"*  6.23  6.47  6.72  6.85  6.77
Contractual Savings  Assets  34.11  36.19  38.99  40.20  40.88
(percent of total assets)
Registered Pension Funds  5.65  5.80  5.66  5.71  5.51
Sugar Industry Pension Funds  3.92  4.84  4.79  5.25  4.09
Insured & Administered**  18.26  17.87  17.22  17.05  16.57
Total Occupational Pension Funds  27.83  28.51  27.67  28.01  26.16
NPF  40.40  39.46  39.33  39.68  40.51
NSF  3.15  3.78  4.36  5.01  5.30
Insurance Companies  46.89  46.12  45.86  44.35  44.60
Total  118.26  117.87  117.22  117.05  116.57
Less Double Counting**  18.26  17.87  17.22  17.05  16.57
Contractual Savings  Assets  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
* estimates;  ** insured and admninistered  pension funds
Source: FSC, NPF, NSF.
2Contractual  savinFs amounted to MUR 54 billion in 2001, equivalent  to 41
percent of GDP (Table  1).  In 2001,  the sector covered the National Pensions Fund, the
National Savings Fund, 22 active insurance companies and 1007 occupational  pension
funds created  by statutory bodies  and private sector companies (of the latter, 37 were
self-administered  and registered with the Registrar of Associations; the remainder were
either insured or administered by insurance companies).
Funded occupational  pension funds accounted for 26 percent of total net assets of
contractual  savings institutions, the NPF and NSF together represented 46 percent of total
net assets, while the non-pension  assets  of insurance  companies accounted for the
remaining 28 percent. Public sector institutions, including the NPF, NSF and SICOM
were responsible  for managing 57 percent of the total, although the operations of SICOM
are no different  from those of any private sector manager.
The main types of contractual  savings institutions exhibit significant differences
in their asset allocation policies (Table 2). As a group, contractual  savings institutions
favor government securities  (mostly two-year treasury bills) and housing loans. The NPF
invests more heavily in government securities,  but is underweight in company shares and
foreign assets. The NPF provides substantial indirect support to the financing of the
housing market,  through its sizable loans to the Mauritius Housing Corporation.
Table 2: Asset Allocation of Contractual Savings,  2001
Pension  NPF  Insurance  All
Percent of total  assets  Funds  Companies
Government  Securities  21  58  15  35
Non-Government  Bonds  3  5  8  6
Company Shares  15  7  17  12
Bank deposits  6  11  9  10
Housing Loans  27  8  23  17
Loans to Sponsors  4
Real Estate  8  2  6  5
Foreign Investment  12  4  9  7
Other  4  5  13  7
Total  100  100  100  100
Source: Estimated on the basis of data collected by the FSC, NPF and Registrar  of Associations
Pension funds and insurance companies  are more heavily involved in extending
direct housing loans and in holding company shares and foreign assets.2 However, there
are large  differences  in asset allocation  policies among individual  pension funds and
insurance  companies, which  tend to deviate significantly from the average pattern of their
respective  sectors.
'  The reported data aggregate  statistics of individual pension  funds. Most funds have financial  years
ending in December but several report at the end of June and some use other months.
2  The asset allocation  of insurance companies differs from the data published by the FSC. This is because
official statistics do not divide clearly the various types of assets. The figures reported  in Table 2 were
estimated from a perusal of the annual reports of all operating companies.  The high level of "other assets"
is worth noting. To some extent, it reflects "loans to shareholders"  among the more closely  held companies
3Most types of contractual  savings institutions benefit from positive cash flows and
their total assets are likely to continue to grow relative to GDP. This has important
implications for the need to develop robustly regulated and effectively  supervised
financial institutions and markets, but also for the need to increase overseas investments
in order to achieve a more optimal level of risk diversification.  Pension funds and
insurance companies play an active part in the provision of long-term and fixed-rate
housing loans  and have in general a strong demand for long-duration  assets. They can
stimulate the issue of long-term government bonds (both inflation-linked and zero-
coupon) and the development of corporate debentures, mortgage bonds and mortgage-
backed securities.
ERl.  ffnsfitutionalt  Structure of IPenson System
The institutions of the Mauritian pension system can be divided into two separate
groups: those that are occupationally based and those that are based on more general
characteristics.  The BRP, NPF and NSF belong to the second group, whereas the CSPS
and the funds  established by statutory bodies and private companies form the first group.
This section summarizes the main features of the general  group and then reviews the
different types of occupational pension schemes.
A.  Non-Occupational  Pension Schemes
Basic Retirement Pension (BRP)
The BRP is a universal pension that is financed from general taxes. It is equal to
20 percent of average earnings  and is paid to all people aged over 60 years. Its current
cost is estimated at 3 percent of GDP (2000), but demographic  aging is projected to raise
this to 6 percent by 2020 and 11 percent by 2050 (World Bank 2001). The government is
considering various options for containing the cost of the BRP. These essentially include
raising the retirement age and introducing means tested benefits (see the Annex to this
paper for more details).
National Pensions Fund (NPF)
The NPF is a compulsory  scheme that covers all employees of private sector
firms, except those on very low wages and some sugar industry employees.3 It is a
defined benefit scheme  operating on the French point system. It covers over 300,000
employees or 60 percent of the labor force. Beneficiaries are still less than 50,000,
resulting in a support ratio of over 6 active contributors per beneficiary.
Contributions  are paid by both employers and employees and amount respectively
to 6 and 3 percent for a total of 9 percent of covered earnings (subject to a ceiling).
Contributions result in the accumulation of points on the basis of the declared cost of a
point at the time of contribution. Pension benefits depend on the accumulated points and
the declared  value of a point at the time of retirement.  The cost and value of points have
3  The NPF also admimsters the BRP, the benefits and administration  expenses of which are covered by
budgetary transfers.
4been set a ratio of 11 to 1 (implying an annuity conversion factor of 9.09 percent).  In a
fully-indexed  system (or in a world without inflation and wage growth),  a 40-year
contributory career would produce a replacement rate of just below 33 percent of indexed
earnings.
Initially,  the cost and value of a point lagged inflation by a significant margin. As
a result, the real level of the cost and value of a point fell to 75 percent of the original
level. However, since 1989 the cost and value of a point have been adjusted in line with
price inflation.  Because of this under-indexation  and of the positive real wage growth, the
resulting pensions have been a lower percentage of pre-retirement earnings  than the
targeted level of 33 percent. As a result, the performance of the NPF as a pension
institution has not been fully  satisfactory.
The ceiling on covered earnings was initially set at a very high level (175 percent
of average earnings).  However, it has also been broadly indexed to prices (rather than
wages) and this has resulted in its relative  decline over time (presently it amounts to 80
percent of average earnings).  This has left more  scope for the development of
occupational  pension schemes. The lower earnings limit has also fallen in relative terms
(from the original 25 percent to about 11.5 percent  of average earnings in 2001), thus
widening the net of covered workers.
The NPF has accumulated substantial financial resources equivalent to 17 percent
of GDP. These are heavily invested in government bonds (58 percent) with relatively
small shares in corporate securities  and foreign assets. Asset allocation is not subject to
legally imposed limits but is decided by an Investment Committee, comprising senior
civil servants. The performance of the NPF as a rmancial institution has been
satisfactory. The real investment return averaged nearly 4 percent in the 1990s  (and
almost 5 percent over the past five years),  while its operating expenses have been on a
declining trend. In 2001, they  amounted to 9.2 percent of contributions  or 48 basis points
of average total assets. The NPF's investment and operating performance  has been
superior to that of the average private sector pension fund during the period under
review.4
This satisfactory performance was marred by the discovery in February 2003 of a
fraud that had been  ongoing for five years and involved a time deposit of MUR 500
million with the Mauritius Commercial  Bank (MCB), the largest and oldest commercial
bank in the country. The details of the scandal are still unraveling at the time of writing
this paper. However,  its non-detection for many years indicates a major deficiency in
internal audit and control systems at both of these nationally important institutions. The
NPF accounts are audited by the Director of Audits, but usually with a lag of at least two
years. This incident underscores  the importance of commissioning external audits by
private international firms as well as the need to strengthen internal audit and control
systems.
4  This is related to the poor performance of domestic and foreign equities  in the late 1990s. Over a longer
period, the average private pension fund probably outperformed  the NPF.
5The N]PF faces two major challenges. First, there is a need for a greater
diversification  of its assets in non-government  securities (corporate securities  and foreign
assets).  Investing a greater proportion of assets in such securities  would require the
creation of a more transparent,  professional and independent fund governance  and asset
management  structure. The second challenge is to enhance the transparency of its
operations, simplify the link between contributions and benefits, and improve its
performance  as a pension institution. The authorities  are considering conversion of the
NPF from its current opaque point system to a defined contribution system with
individual capitalization  accounts, crediting of net investment returns to workers'
accounts  and purchase of a real annuity on retirement  (see the Annex for more details).
Nationnal Savings Fund (NSF)
The NSF is a defined-contribution  scheme that offers covered workers a lump
sum on retirement.  All employees  are required to participate  in the NSF, including civil
servants and employees  of statutory bodies. The contribution rate amounts to 2.5 percent
of covered earnings and is paid by employers. The NSF has accumulated resources
equivalent to 2 percent of GDP. These are heavily invested in government securities. The
NSF does not play a major part either as a pension fund or as a financial institution. It
could be merged into the activities of a reformed NPF in the future.
B. Oc-cupational ]Pension  Schemes
Occupational  pension schemes cover three main types: the civil service pension
scheme (as well as those covering local government  employees); pension schemes for
various statutory bodies; and pension  schemes established  by private sector entities. The
latter two types operate heavily (but not fully) funded schemes that have accumulated
substantial resources,  amounting to MUR  14 billion in 2001 and corresponding  to 11
percent of GDP. However, the scheme covering  civil servants is unfunded and is financed
from the budget.  Its cost was estimated at 1.3 percent of GDP in 2001.
Table 3: Number of Approved Occupational Pension Schemes (1998-2002)
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Total Number  882  922  967  1007  1095
Registered  30  32  35  37  42
Insured and/or Administered  852  890  932  970  1053
Source: Tax Commissioner and Registrar of Associations
Approved pension schemes,  outside those covering civil servants and local
government employees,  increased from 882 in 1998  to 1007 in 2001  (and 1095 in 2002).
The number of self-administered  and registered funds rose from 30 in 1998 to 37 in 2001
(and 42 in 2002). The vast majority of funds, old as well as new, continues to be insured
and/or administered by insurance companies (Table 3). Anglo-Mauritius  Life Assurance
Company appears to have the lion's share of group pension insurance business, facing
competition from a small number of life insurance companies.
6However,  about  100 pension schemes of statutory bodies and  some 40 private
company schemes are administered (but not insured) by the State Insurance Corporation
of Mauritius  (SICOM).  In terms of total assets (and perhaps  also membership) these
exceed the funds insured and managed by other insurance companies.
The main self-administered  funds include the pension schemes of the Rogers
Group,  the Mauritius Commercial  Bank and the New Mauritius Hotels Group as well as
some statutory bodies (e.g., the Central Electricity Board and from this year the State
Bank of Mauritius). Most large companies establish two pension schemes, catering
separately for clerical and manual  staff.
There  are no detailed data on the total coverage of occupational  pension schemes
and on how many of them continue to be active. The Civil Service Pension Scheme has
some 50,000 civil servants and the schemes administered  by SICOM have close to
22,000 members. The three Sugar Industry Pension Funds list 6,000 members, while four
large self-administered funds have over 800 active members each. Thus, all these
schemes collectively  have over 80,000 members. It follows that even on very
conservative  assumptions, the total coverage of occupational pension schemes is likely to
exceed  100,000 employees  or 20 percent of the labor force.
Private sector companies establish their pension schemes under the Employees
Superannuation Fund Act of 1982 (which  amended the earlier  1954 Act), while the
schemes of statutory bodies are governed by the Statutory Bodies Pension Funds Act of
1978. Private schemes are sometimes established  as trusts.  The use of trusts is likely to
grow, especially in the offshore  sector. Irrespective of legal form, private pension
schemes often outsource several  aspects of their administration even when they are not
insured. The terms and conditions of all schemes must be approved by the Tax
Commissioner in order to be eligible for the considerable  tax benefits.  These include
deductibility of contributions without any ceilings  and exemption of investment income
from any tax. Pension benefits,  but not commuted  lump sums, are subject to income tax.
Another important component of the overall system is the obligation under the
Labor Act for most employers  to provide  a lump sum retirement gratuity of half a
month's pay for each year of service. This is not a prefunded benefit. In the case of many
employers it is the only retirement benefit offered on top of the BRP and NPF.
The Civil Service  Pension Scheme (CSPS)
The CSPS covers civil servants and operates on an unfunded basis. In line with
similar schemes in most countries around the world it has elements that tend to distort
incentives and cause large increases in expenditures  (such as use of the last monthly
salary for calculating pensions, early retirement with generous benefits, indexation to
same rank earnings, and lump-sum commutation by using a fixed formula,  irrespective of
life expectancy and level of interest rates).  Because of progressive aging of the covered
population, the cost of the CSPS is projected to increase from its current level of 20
percent of the total salaries bill to 30 percent in 15 years time and 50 percent by 2050. At
that time, benefits paid could increase from the current level of 1.3 percent of GDP to
7between 3 and 3.5 percent. The unfunded accrued liabilities are estimated at 33 percent of
GDP (World ]Bank 2001).
The CSPS faces several critical policy issues. The first concerns the establishment
of an appropriate basis and level of funding in order to protect benefits from future
budgetary pressures. The second is a need to harmonize its terms and conditions  with
those offered by private sector entities in order to facilitate labor mobility between the
civil service and the private sector. However,  in addressing these challenges it is
important to examine the whole compensation package of civil servants to ensure that the
civil service continues  to be able to attract, train and retain high caliber staff.
As in many other countries around the world, one feasible reform option would be
to create a defined-contribution  scheme for new recruits to the civil service, while
continuing the defined-benefit  scheme for existing civil servants. A DC scheme would be
both funded and fully portable and would not pose any obstacles to labor mobility.5
Pension Funds of Statutory Bodies
The pension schemes for the employees of statutory bodies also are non-
contributory  and offer similar benefits to those of the civil service scheme.  However, one
fundamental  difference is that the pension schemes of statutory bodies are required, by
virtue of the Statutory Bodies Pension Funds Act of 1978, to create a fund covering their
actuarial liabilities. These funds are administered by the State Insurance Corporation of
Mauritius (SICOM) but are not insured by it. They are not therefore included in its
balance sheet but are reported in the notes to its annual report. SICOM administers the
pension funds of 100 statutory bodies covering nearly 13,000 members. (It also manages
38 private sector funds with nearly  10,000 members.)  The statutory pension funds have
contribution rates ranging from  15 to 25 percent of covered earnings.  The market value of
the total assets of the pension funds managed (but not insured) by SICOM amounted in
June 2002 to MIUR 6.2 billion.
While most occupational  pension  schemes are heavily funded with assets invested
outside the sponsoring employer, the two funds of the Central Electricity Board (for
manual and non-manual  workers respectively) effectively  operate on an unfunded basis.
This is because the vast majority of their resources have been lent back to the CEB. For
the two funds together, loans to the CEB represent 75 percent of total assets and housing
loans to staff another 23 percent. The CEB pension schemes are in principle contributory
schemes, with employees  required to contribute 6 percent of covered earnings. However,
since  1993, the contributions of employees have been paid by the CEB. The 2 pension
funds of the Central Electricity Board are among a few funds of statutory bodies that are
not managed by SICOM. The financial situation of the CEB pension funds is currently
complicated by fact that the CEB is suffering losses, has accumulated a huge debt, and
has plans under study for a major restructuring.
5  The terms and conditions  of the new scheme and the benefits of greater mobility would need to be well
communicated to members to minimize the risk of political backlash.
8Private Company Pension Schemes
Most of the nearly  1000 private company pension  schemes are non-contributory
and operate as defined-benefit  plans offering pensions equal to two-thirds of final salary
on the last month of employment after 40 years of service (480 months). They are thus
somewhat less generous than the civil service pension scheme or the statutory bodies
pension funds. Moreover,  annual pension increases  are limited by tax regulations  to no
more than 3 percent per year.
Private company pension  schemes tend to be paternalistic, operating on a non-
contributory  basis and offering several additional services, including in particular housing
loans.  Some funds extend housing loans to members at low, below-market, rates.
However, sponsoring employers compensate their pension funds for the rate subsidy.
The high level of benefits of most private company pension schemes, especially
because they involve the offer of deferred long-term annuities in the face of a serious
dearth of long-term assets, should raise questions about the continued affordability of
these schemes. This also underscores the importance  of effective supervision  to ensure
the security of pension assets and the honoring of the pension rights of workers.
A recent exception to the prevalence of defined benefit plans is the Rogers  Group,
which converted its plan into a money purchase scheme (defined-contribution  plan) in
1999.  Another 100 small pension schemes, including that of Mauritius Union, a medium
size insurance company,  have also converted to DC plans.
The new Rogers Group pension fund offers a good example of the continuing
paternalistic approach adopted by sponsoring employers. The Rogers Group covers all
administration  costs of the new DC fund.  It has also offered a guarantee to all employees
in service at the time of conversion,  such that their pension benefits would be no lower
than what they would have been entitled to had the conversion not taken place. This
guarantee is of course on maintaining contributions to the scheme. The Rogers money
6
purchase scheme is contributory  and contribution rates increase with age.
The conversion of company schemes from DB to DC plans may represent an
early response to the high cost uncertainties  of DB plans. However, DC plans transfer the
investment risk to workers.  As they proliferate,  there will be a growing need for
developing "protected"  investment products, whereby employees benefit from protection
against downside risk but have less than  full participation in the upside potential. The
modalities of "protected " investments are still evolving around the world. To be effective
they require development of efficient risk-sharing facilities with specialized financial
institutions. DC plans also require the development of an efficient and robust annuity
market for fulfilling the objective of providing an adequate  and secure pension to retired
workers.
6  The no-worse-off guarantee may have set an expensive precedent since participating  employees will reap
the benefits of good investment returns, while employers  will have to make any shortfall.
9WV.  Rimvestment and Gjperagniag Performance
The various occupational  pension funds appear to adopt different investment
policies and are characterized  by large variations in their asset allocations  (Table 4).
There are significant differences between large pension funds (those with more than
MUR 100 million in assets), medium funds (those with between MUR 30 and 100
million under management)  and small funds (those with less than MUR 30 million in
assets). Most funds invest heavily in equities and also have substantial assets in foreign
securities, but some focus more heavily on housing loans and real estate.
The Sugar Industry Pension Funds are heavily engaged in the latter two areas.
Apart from the funds administered by SICOM and some of the smaller self-administered
funds, the large occupational pension funds invest small amounts in government
securities. Rather surprisingly given that they are managed by large insurance companies,
the insured funds have a small proportion of their assets invested overseas. The CEB
funds are predominantly invested in loans to the sponsoring employer and housing loans
to members but several smaller funds also have large exposures to their sponsors. Some
of the medium and small pension funds invest increasingly in mutual funds, which are
classified as other assets in Table 4. The category "other assets" is relatively large for
several pension funds and insurance companies. In addition to investments in mutual
funds, it also includes "loans to shareholders", which are important for some insurance
companies.
Table 4: Asset Allocation of Pension Funds, 2001
Govt  NonGvt  Comp  Bank  Hsng  Loans  Real  For  Other
Sec  Bonds  Shares  Deps  Loans  Spons  Estate  Assets  Assets
Large Pension Funds  0.4  0.6  24  9  23  25  6  11  1
MediumPensionFunds  11  17  26  12  8  4  2  13  7
Small Pension Funds  18  6  22  13  0.4  6  1  13  20.6
Total Registered  3  4  24  10  19  20  5  11  4
Sugar Industry  2  9  5  37  32  14  1
SICOM  43  2  11  1  26  2  15
Insured  9  6  20  13  30  6  5  11
Total occupational  21  3  15  6  27  4  8  12  4
NPF  58  5  7  11  8  2  4  5
Total Pension Fnds  43  4  10  9  16  2  4  7  5
Insurance Companies  15  8  17  9  24  6  9  12
NSF  82  3  6  9
Total  34  5  12  9  18  1  5  8  8
Double Counting  32  3  13  5  28  3  12  4
Grand Total  35  6  12  10  17  1  5  7  7
Source: Estimated on the basis of data collected by the FSC, NPF and Registrar of Associations.
Registered pension funds invest small amounts in government securities. This is
especially true for the larger funds  and is attributed to the short maturity of government
debt. Insurance companies hold about 7 percent of outstanding domestic government debt
while the NPF and NSF account for a combined 28 percent of total domestic public debt.
10Thus, the asset allocation of self-administered funds differs substantially from that of the
NPF. In some respects, this underscores the scope for further asset diversification by the
NPF. However, it is important to note that many of the equity holdings of occupational
pension funds represent locked-in positions. Some fund managers complain that the
equity market is so illiquid that it moves against them whether they want to sell or buy.
The pension funds and insurance companies play an important part in housing
finance  (Table 5). They account for 36 percent of the market,  a similar share to that of
commercial banks (35.percent) and somewhat larger than that of the Mauritius Housing
Corporation (29 percent).  However, the share of housing loans declined from 30 to 24
percent of the total assets of insurance companies and pension funds between  1998 and
2001.
Housing loans are attractive to the large self-administered  funds as well as the
funds insured or administered  by insurance  companies because of their high return, low
default rate and long maturity. Insurance companies and pension funds lend at fixed rates
of interest whereas commercial  banks provide variable rate loans. Developing markets for
mortgage bonds and mortgage  securitization would allow pension funds and insurance
companies to support the housing finance market indirectly and thus  avoid the high
expense of mortgage loan origination and servicing. These markets  would also enable
commercial banks to avoid the interest rate risk they currently assume.
Table 5: Role in Housing Finance, 1998-2001
(percent of total housing loans)  1998  1999  2000  2001
Insurance Companies  28.48  27.23  28.28  29.13
Sugar Industry Pension Funds  4.56  4.51  4.34  4.18
Self-Administered  PensionFunds  3.21  3.00  2.97  2.90
All Contractual Savings Institutions  36.25  34.75  35.59  36.22
Commercial Banks  32.37  36.33  35.18  35.21
MHC  31.38  28.92  29.22  28.58
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Total (MUR million)  15357  17294  18332  19213
Total (% GDP)  15.37  16.11  15.47  14.61
Source: FSC, Registrar of Associations, MHC, SIPF.
The operating and investment performance  of occupational  pension funds has
varied considerably  over time (Table 6). Data derived from the annual reports that self-
administered  funds submit to the Registrar of Associations show that over the period
1997-2001  reported operating expenses have been on a rising trend, relative to both
annual contributions and average assets.
To some extent this may reflect a fuller reporting of costs. Many funds only
include out of pocket expenses among the reported operating costs (for instance,
professional fees for auditors and actuaries and levies paid to the Registrar).  Other costs
are incurred directly by the sponsoring employers. But an increasing number of funds
report most expenses, even if the sponsoring employer covers the total costs.
11Tablle 6: Operating Performance of Registered Pension Funds (1997-2001)
(percent)  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Operating Expenses/Contributions  3.82  4.81  6.47  7.56  5.86
Operating Expenses/Average  Assets  0.53  0.56  0.61  1.06  0.66
Investment Income/Average Assets  8.66  9.09  7.24  9.61  4.71
Benefits/Contributions  42.3  46.0  54.4  46.1  45.3
Benefits/Total  Inflows  26.1  25.8  30.3  11.8  31.4
Investment Income/Total  Inflows  38.3  43.7  43.0  17.5  29.0
Growth Rate of Total Assets  19.2  22.9  12.6  15.4  7.8
Source: Estimated on the basis of date collected by the FSC and Registrar of Associations.
Table 7: Operating Perforrmance of Occupational  Pensionm Funds, 2001
Oper Exp/  Oper Exp/  Inv Inc/  Inv Inc/  Net Flow/
Contr  Aver Assets  Aver Assets  Tot Inflow  Aver Assets
Large Pension Funds  4.24  0.49  4.27  26.5  10.3
Medium Pension Funds  11.40  0.97  5.75  40.1  7.6
Small Pension Funds  12.07  2.15  7.69  29.5  20.9
Total Registered  5.86  0.66  4.71  29.0  10.3
Sugar Industry PF  6.80  0.43  6.92  52.4  5.5
Registered & SIPF  6.14  0.56  5.67  38.0  8.2
NPF  9.22  0.48  11.16  68.3  14.3
Source: Estimated on the basis of data collected by the FSC and the Registrar of Associations.
Table 8: Comparative Operating and Investment Performance (1997-2001)
(percent)  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Average*
Operating Expenses
Large Registered Pension Funds  0.39  0.41  0.44  0.97  0.49  0.56
Medium Registered Pension Funds  0.78  0.92  0.96  1.03  0.97  0.97
Small Registered Pension Funds  2.41  1.95  1.96  2.35  2.15  2.13
All Registered Pension Funds  0.53  0.56  0.61  1.06  0.66  0.72
National Pensions Fund  0.77  0.70  0.58  0.53  0.48  0.61
Investmnent Returns
Large Registered Pension Funds  9.03  9.07  7.13  10.27  4.27  7.93
Medium Registered Pension Funds  6.87  9.23  7.37  7.81  5.75  7.40
Small Registered Pension Funds  9.04  8.72  8.58  8.94  7.69  8.59
All Registered Pension Funds  8.66  9.09  7.24  9.61  4.71  7.85
National  Pensions Fund  10.00  14.26  10.57  10.56  11.16  11.30
Insured/Administered Pension Funds  10.88  13.38  10.94  10.21  9.49  10.97
* The average investment return is the compounded average for the five-year period.
All reported rates are weighted averages.
Source:  Estimated on the basis of date collected by the FSC, NPF and Registrar of Associations.
12In contrast to company pension funds, the operating costs of the NPF have fallen
relative to its contributions  and assets. However,  both the NPF and the company funds
report low operating expenses in comparison  to the levels found in Chile and other Latin
American countries or to personal pension plans in the United Kingdom. To a large
extent this is explained by the absence of marketing and selling costs.
The investment performance of registered funds has fluctuated considerably over
time, reflecting realized (and in a few cases, unrealized) capital gains and losses. In
general, the investment performance of occupational pension funds has been inferior to
that of the NPF over the second half of the 1990s (Tables 7 and 8). Although detailed
data covering  a longer period are not available, it is likely that the private pension funds
outperformed  the NPF in earlier periods when domestic and foreign equity market returns
were much higher.
. The operating and investment performance of occupational  pension funds also
varies considerable from fund to fund (Table 7). Data for 2001 show that large pension
funds report lower operating expenses.  This is explained by the presence of economies of
scale. Nevertheless,  the high level of operating  expenses of small funds at over 2 percent
of assets is worth noting. In contrast,  small funds seem to earn higher investment returns,
even though all company pension funds performed badly in 2001, especially relative to
the NPF. The 3 Sugar Industry Pension Funds report better retums in 2001 than the
registered pension funds. This probably reflects their greater investments in real estate
and housing loans compared to company funds that are more heavily invested in
company shares.
The differences  in operating and investment performance  of different  types of
pension funds over time are shown clearly in Table 8. Small funds consistently report
high operating costs as well as slightly higher investment returns. As noted, part of the
difference in operating costs may be explained by under-reporting of costs by large
pension funds. Large employers are more likely than small employers  to absorb various
types of operating expenses,  such as rent for premises and the salary cost of fund
administrators and asset managers. On the basis of collected data, some self-administered
funds that probably outsource the administration and investment functions to specialist
providers tend to report full operating costs, while others clearly understate operating
costs. In the calculation of these operating  cost ratios, insurance premiums paid for
various insurance services have been excluded as these do not constitute costs incurred
for the administration  and investment management of pension funds.
The good investment  and operating performance of the NPF and of the funds
insured and/or administered by insurance companies should be noted. For the NPF this is
linked to the absence of prescribed investment limits and the strong performance of
government securities in which the NPF invests more than half of its assets. Operating
performance  has clearly benefited from the presence of considerable  economies of scale.
The investment performance of insured funds has also benefited from the heavy
allocation in government  securities and housing loans.
13*  While  detailed data on the administration fees charged by insurance companies
are not publicly available, market practitioners indicate a level of around 70 basis points,
at least for the larger funds. The smaller pension  funds are very likely to be charged
higher fees.  Insured pension funds  pay death  and disability insurance premiums,
administration  charges deducted from contributions before investments  are made, and
fund management fees. Comparison with the performance of self-administered  funds
would thus be difficult even if full data were available.  Self-administered funds are able
to seek better deals from specialist providers in each of these areas rather than rely on the
same provider for all of them.
V0 Regiatrion and Sujperisinon
Pension fund regulation  is currently fragmented among several laws and tax
regulations,  while supervision is non-existent.  Occupational  pension funds benefit  from
large tax incentives and must be approved by the Tax Commissioner.  Self-administered
funds must be registered with the Registrar of Associations  or as trusts, while insured
funds and funds administered by insurance  companies must submit an insurance
certificate to the Tax Commissioner. There are regulations on minimum vesting and
portability provisions,  fund governance,  and publication of audited accounts. But pension
funds are not required to hire qualified auditors,  to use external custodians, or to observe
limits on self-investing in sponsoring employers. However,  sponsoring employers must
comply with prescribed accounting standards  on the valuation  of pension liabilities (IAS
19/MAS 25).
Tax incentives follow the EET regime (Exempt contributions,  Exempt investment
income, Tax benefits).  Contributions and investment income are in fact exempt without
any ceiling or limit (except  to the extent that pension benefits cannot exceed two-thirds  of
pensionable salary),  while pension benefits are taxed,  except for the amount of the
pension that is commuted to a lump sum on retirement. This tax treatment  is more
generous that that of most countries with  funded occupational pension schemes.  To
contain the tax privileges afforded to retirement saving, most countries limit the
deductibility of contributions both by applying a limit on the contribution  rate and an
upper ceiling on eligible earnings (as well  as having a limit on pension benefits).
Investment income  is also often subject to a reduced tax rate rather than benefiting from
complete exemption  (Davis  1995). However, the tax attractiveness  of retirement saving is
weakened in Mauritius by the low personal income tax rates and the very wide
availability of personal  deductions.
The main law for pension funds established by private companies is the
Employees  Superannuation Fund Act of 1982 (as  amended).8 This provides that any
employer may constitute a fund and make contributions for the payment of pensions and
other benefits to directors or employees and their dependants  (section 3). Pension funds
7  This is especially  true for approved personal pension schemes, retirement annuities, and retirement
savings schemes that are available but apparently little used.
8 This Act mainly applies to the self-administered  funds. Insured funds  are covered for the most part by
the Insurance  Act.  This is geared  toward general protection of policyholders (in this case employers)  and
does not cover fully the interests of employees.
14must be a body corporate and be registered with the Registrar of Associations (section 4).
The rules of the fund must stipulate, inter  alia, the rate of contributions paid by the
employer and employees, the rate of accrual  and method of calculation of benefits, the
conditions of membership, the appointment of employer  and employee representatives  to
the management committee of the fund, the security to be provided by officers of the
fund, the appointment of auditors, the disclosure of information on the rules and
performance  of the fund, and the dissolution of the fund and disposal of its assets,
including amalgamation with any other fund (section  6 and Second Schedule of the Act).
The fund is managed by a management  committee of no less than 5 persons, nominated
by the employer and the employees (section 7). However, no parity of representation is
required. The Act specifies that no member of the management committee shall be liable
for any losses unless they have been caused by willful negligence or fraud (section 8).
Payments to the fund by employers and employees  are irrevocable (section  10). This
implies that any surplus over and above the present value of actuarial liabilities belongs
to the fund, although employers  are not prevented from taking contribution holidays.
Audited accounts must be submitted to the Registrar within 3 months of the end
of each financial year (section  11). The income and expenditure  statement and the
balance sheet must be audited by 2 auditors, one appointed by the employer and the other
by the employees  (section  12). However,  the Act does not require the hiring of qualified
auditors. The Registrar has broad powers of inspection and investigation, may cause an
inquiry into the affairs of a fund, and may with the approval of the President strike off the
Register a fund for reasons set out in its decision (sections 13 and 14). Such Registrar
decisions  may be appealed to the Supreme Court. On winding up, the assets of the fund
are vested in the Registrar. They are first used to discharge  all third party debts and
liabilities and are then applied to the payment of the present value, as determined by an
actuary, of the amounts due to pensioners  and then to the accrued benefits of employees
in active service (section  15). A fee is payable by each fund to the Registrar of
Associations to meet its expenses (section  16). This amounts to 0.25 percent of the
investment income of each fund.
The Income Tax Regulations  1996 (as amended)  stipulate that pension schemes
must be approved by the Tax Commissioner,  who requires either' an insurance certificate
or registration  with the Registrar of Associations (section  5(1)(b)(ii)). The Tax
Commissioner must, inter alia, be satisfied that: employee contributions are reasonable;
all  members are treated equally;  annual pension benefits, excluding NPF pensions, do not
exceed two-thirds of final pensionable emoluments  (section 5(2)(c)(vi)); commuted
lump-sum payments do not exceed  12.5 times the amount commuted which, in turn, does
not exceed 25 percent of the annual pension due (section 5(2)(c)(vii)); permanent
disability and death benefits do not exceed twice final pensionable emoluments;
dependent pensions do not exceed specified limits; eligibility  and withdrawal  provisions
are reasonable; powers of investment of fund assets are reasonable;  annual pension
increases do not exceed same rank salary increases or 3 percent of the preceding year's
pension; employees leaving after 5 years'  service are entitled to preserve their accrued
benefits in the fund of the old employer, or transfer the actuarial value of these benefits to
the pension fund of their new employer,  or transfer this value to an approved personal
pension scheme  (section 5(2)(c)(xvii));  and, employees leaving before completing five
15years'  service  are entitled to a refund of their accumulated  contributions, provided that
the related actuarial value of the accrued retirement benefits from a previous  employment
has not been  transferred to the superannuation  fund established by the new employer.9
The regulatory framework is obviously very extensive. However, it has some
important gaps. There  are no explicit requirements:  for maintaining a proper funding
level to secure scheme benefits; for ensuring the safe custody of assets; for hiring
qualified actuaries, auditors and custodians; for imposing on actuaries, auditors and
custodians the responsibility  to inform  the supervisory  authority of any material breaches
of regulations;  or for submitting regular reports to the supervisory authority.1 0
There  are also no rules on investments and asset diversification.  While the
absence of minimum investment rules and the investment  freedom enjoyed by fund
managers mark a welcome departure from prevailing practice in most developing
countries, failure to impose limits on self-investing in sponsoring employers and to
require reasonable asset diversification  may place pension fund assets at unnecessary
risk.
Neither the Employees Superannuation  Fund Act nor the Income Tax Regulations
specify that pension funds must undertake periodic  actuarial reviews.  Sponsoring
employers who must publish audited accounts are required to comply with the revised
international  accounting standard on pension liabilities (IAS 19, adopted in Mauritius as
MAS25). IAS 19 specifies,  inter alia, the AA corporate bond yields (or similar) as the
discount rates to be used in valuing actuarial  liabilities and requires employers  to report
in their accounts  any shortfall  in the pension fund they sponsor.  Although there is no
systematic monitoring of the shortfall situation of pension funds in Mauritius,  it is
estimated that on average pension schemes  suffer from a 20 to 25 percent  shortfall.
Actuarial reviews are undertaken at regular intervals, mostly every 3 years. Local
actuaries use investment  return assumptions that are close  to, or slightly higher than,
projected rates of salary growth.  Mortality tables are selected from the set that is
produced by the UK Institute of Actuaries.
Pension funds with defined-benefit  plans operate with a large duration mismatch
of their assets  and liabilities,  since there is a shortage of long-term assets, other than
equities and real estate.  At present,  this mismatch does not cause problems because
interest rates on short-term instruments  are high.  But pension funds face a large
reinvestment risk. They could find themselves in a situation of huge shortfalls as a result
of a large and persistent  fall in interest rates. Actuaries should be required to report on the
exposure of pension funds to such an occurrence,  however unlikely it may seem at
present, in order to facilitate early preventive action.
9  The wording of this provision which  was added in August 2000 is not clear. It appears to be stipulating
that leaving employees  who transferred  the actuarial value of accrued benefits from a previous employment
have the same portability rights as employees with more than 5 years of service.
10  As argued further below,  financial reports should be submitted  in electronic form, preferably on a
quarterly basis. The FSC should develop a capability for efficient analysis of financial reports and off-site
surveillance.
16There is clearly a strong need for a new comprehensive  pension fund act to
consolidate and modernize the regulatory framework. Modernization  of regulation  should
cover:  clear designation of a supervisory  authority; fund governance;  appropriate  funding
levels; vesting and portability standards;  asset segregation and safe custody; asset
valuation and diversification  (including low limits on investing in their sponsors);
actuarial, accounting  and auditing standards (including the responsibilities  of actuaries,
auditors, compliance officers and custodians  to report material breaches  of regulations  to
the supervisory authority);  financial reporting (through frequent submission of data in
electronic form), disclosure and transparency;  off-site surveillance and on-site-inspection
by the supervisors; and powers of intervention and remedial action (Vittas  1998).
A major shortcoming is the complete absence of any supervision. Most countries
that have a large number of occupational pension schemes suffer from inadequate
supervision that tends to be passive and reactive rather than proactive with the authorities
responding to problems and abuses on an ad hoc basis. The usually large number of
company pension funds makes proactive  supervision more difficult to implement.
Although there have been no reports of major scandal, the lack of supervision is a source
of concern.
Pension funds should be supervised by the FSC. The FSC should be required to
collect comprehensive  data on a quarterly basis and publish periodic data on the
performance of the sector and an annual report with a more comprehensive analysis of
trends, achievements  and challenges.  The FSC should cooperate with auditors,  actuaries
and custodians  to ensure that pension schemes are adequately funded and their assets are
properly diversified and valued.
Proactive supervision needs to be promoted. It should include sophisticated off-
site surveillance based on quarterly electronic financial reporting, use of an early warning
system and, in the case of defined benefit plans, application of dynamic solvency testing.
The regulator should be empowered to challenge and even vet the actuarial  assumptions
used by actuaries, such as discount rates  and mortality tables, in calculating the present
value of pension liabilities  and the adequacy of funding levels.
Proactive supervision should also involve adoption of effective on-site inspection
programs, focusing on the adequacy of fund governance,  internal controls and risk
management  systems. Auditors, actuaries, custodians and compliance officers should all
be required to report to the regulator any material breaches of regulations,  irregularities in
financial  accounts and instances of misconduct that come to their attention. The
authorities should also develop efficient crisis response policies to ensure that corrective
measures are taken early to prevent failures that might cause large losses to participating
workers.
In strengthening  the regulation and supervision of pension funds, care should be
taken to avoid any disruption to the good overall performance  of the larger schemes.
Proactive  supervision should not be accompanied by the imposition of intrusive
investment limits. While clear limits should be imposed on self-investment,  no attempt
should, otherwise, be made to direct the asset allocation of pension funds. Pension funds
17should be expected to adopt a "prudent expert" approach and hold diversified investment
portfolios. When the NPF is converted to a DC scheme and merged with the NSF, the
financial  aspects of its operations should also come under the supervision of the FSC.
VIL  IFuture Prospects  aaiid lPoHcy llssues
Before discussing the future prospects and main policy issues of occupational
pension funds it would be useful to evaluate their structure and performance  against a set
of economic criteria, such as coverage,  affordability,  security, investment  performance,
operating efficiency  and transparency.
Employer-sponsored  pension funds, especially those based on defined benefit
plans, have several advantages and disadvantages  compared to other forms of pension
provision. At one level, they have the ability to overcome the shortcomings  of
underdeveloped  financial and insurance markets by pooling the mortality risks of their
employees  and avoiding the adverse selection problems that bedevil annuity markets. At
another level, they offer the potential  of professional investment management  with a
better risk/return  profile and lower transaction costs than non-employer-based  schemes
that incur high marketing and administrative costs. In countries with underdeveloped
financial and insurance markets, employer-based  schemes are well placed to provide
retirement income insurance to their workforce (Bodie 1990).
But employer-based  schemes also suffer from several disadvantages.  They are
notoriously less transparent than the pension accounts offered by specialized pension
institutions." 1 They often impose vesting and portability restrictions that penalize early
leavers.12 They rely on the solvency and integrity of sponsoring employers. The security
of worker benefits depends on the creation of a segregated pension fund, maintenance of
an adequate funding level and a well-diversified portfolio as well as proper valuation and
safe custody of assets. This implies the existence of robust regulation and effective
supervision.  Because of the cost and complexity of administration, employer-based funds
tend to be established  by large employers with a stable and skilled labor force. Tax
incentives support the creation of pension funds, although these are also available to other
forms of retirement saving.
A major shortcoming is that employer-sponsored schemes are often seen as an
extension of corporate financial and personnel management functions. In this sense, they
do not meet the primary objective of pension funds which is to provide retirement
benefits to covered workers. Employers almost invariably retain the right to terminate
pension plans and often change terms and conditions to suit their requirements,  paying
secondary regard to the needs of their workers. Nevertheless,  and despite these
shortcomings,  properly regulated employer-based pension funds still have a major role to
"1  This is generally true of DC-based schemes  operated by specialized  institutions  in most Latin American
countries.  Employer-sponsored DB schemes that are insured  with insurance companies also lack
transparency.
12  Early employer pension schemes operated on the so-called tontine principle of insurance  whereby
benefits  were paid only on retirement  (Williamson  1992). The costs of pension schemes  were low but at the
expense of workers who left or were fired before reaching the age of retirement.
18play in pension provision, especially in countries where financial and insurance markets
are underdeveloped.
How do Mauritian company pension funds rate with regard to these
considerations? They provide deferred long-term annuities to covered workers  on terms
and conditions  that most likely are more attractive than those available  in the local
annuity market. They seem to operate with relatively  low operating costs, except for the
smaller funds that suffer from high expense ratios. This is in Iine with international
experience. Their investment performnance has not been fully satisfactory in the 1990s,
probably reflecting the poor returns of the local and foreign equity markets.
The security of retirement  benefits has improved in recent  years. Vesting and
portability rights have been strengthened and now look reasonable, providing better
protection to early leavers.  Accounting  and actuarial  standards require an adequate level
of funding and a reporting of shortfalls. However, funding levels are not monitored
closely and are estimated to suffer from a 20 to 25 percent shortfall. Actuarial
assumptions  look sensible and realistic at present but increasing longevity  and the
reinvestment risk faced by pension funds because of the large duration mismatch of their
assets and liabilities suggest potential difficulties in the future. If investment returns were
to fall and stay at low levels  for a prolonged period, large increases in contributions
would be required to maintain appropriate funding levels.
The regulatory framework is extensive and covers many aspects that are
important for enhancing the security of retirement benefits. However,  some important
elements are rnissing. These include the need for safe custody of assets and for adequate
asset diversification,  especially imposing limits on self-investment in sponsoring
enmployers.  Supervision and transparency require considerable strengthening  (Vittas
1998).
In terms of coverage,  funded occupational pension  schemes cover about 10
percent of the labor force in Mauritius. Adding the unfunded civil service pension scheme
brings the total to 20 percent. This is low by comparison to levels prevailing in leading
high-income countries, such as Australia,  Denmark, the Netherlands,  Sweden,
Switzerland,  the United Kingdom  and the United States where coverage exceeds 70
percent and reaches beyond 90 percent of the labor force (World Bank 1994). But taking
into account the offer of the universal BRP and the operation of the NPF as well as the
structure of the local labor market the current level of coverage looks reasonable.
Long-term affordability is a different story. The promised benefits, which usually
are not integrated with the BRP (although  a large proportion are integrated  with the
*NPF),  result in high replacement rates at relatively young ages. The growing longevity of
the population, which is likely more pronounced  among high-income people, implies a
continuing increase in cost. The recent trend toward DC schemes  is likely to accelerate if
companies  are constrained by growing competition in their product markets from
increasing employer contributions  to the levels that would be required to maintain the
financial  soundness of their schemes. The comparative  advantage of employer-based DC
schemes would then depend on their ability to achieve high investment returns with low
19operating costs and offer attractive but non-guaranteed  annuity options at retirement. As
in most countries, this is likely to be accompanied by a growing demand for protected
investment products.
The future role of occupational pension funds in the Mauritian multi-pillar
pension system will also be shaped by decisions regarding the continued  affordability of
the BRP and especially the restructuring  of the operations of the NPF.
For instance, a gradual increase in the normal entitlement  age for the BRP
coupled with an application  of some means testing would not only ensure its long-term
affordability but would also argue for converting the NPF into a DC scheme, merging it
with the NSF, and introducing greater competition with well-run and transparent private
pension funds. The latter would be achieved by allowing employers who sponsor such
private pension funds to contract out of the NPF.13 An even greater degree of competition
and individual choice would be encouraged by granting workers the right to choose
between the NPF and the pension fund established by their employer.
These measures of reform would ensure that the NPF continues to operate
efficiently and does not end up by dominating  the local financial system. They would
also strengthen the multi-pillar structure of the Mauritian pension system. Their success
would require, however,  a considerable strengthening of the regulatory framework of
occupational  pension funds and especially implementation of an effective system of
proactive supervision. With better regulation  and supervision, workers would enjoy
greater choice and stronger protection of their pension savings, while the financial system
would benefit from greater plurality among institutional investors, intensified competition
and expanded innovation.
Pluralistic pension funds can have a major impact on the development  of the
financial system and the financing of the economy.  They can stimulate the development
of the long-term government bond market (including inflation protected securities  and
zero coupon bonds) as well as the growth of company  debentures, mortgage bonds and
asset-backed  securities. They can  also increase the liquidity and efficiency  of equity
markets. Realization  of these benefits requires effective regulation  and supervision of
both primary  and secondary securities markets.
Experience  from the United States and other high-income countries suggests that
they can play an important part in "symbiotic" finance,  acting as a countervailing force to
the dominant position of commercial banks, supporting the financing  of independent
leasing, factoring and venture capital companies,  and promoting altemative  sources of
financing expanding SMEs. The promotion of these other markets would require the
removal  of regulatory  and tax obstacles and the creation of a robust and effective
framework of financial regulation  and supervision.
Mauritian pension funds  (and other institutional investors, such as insurance
companies) have a huge demand for long-term assets. At present, they are forced to
13  The terms of contracting out would need to well specified.  If all schemes are based on DC plans,
switching between the NPF and employer schemes would be much easier.
20engage in a significant amount of reverse maturity transformation, investing a large part
of their long-term funds in short-term treasury bills as well as medium term bonds and
bank deposits.  Their long-term assets include corporate equities, real estate and housing
loans. Corporate equities  are illiquid and volatile, while real estate has performed well
over the long run but is also illiquid and often produces low yields. Housing loans have
for the most part performed well, although it would be more efficient for pension funds to
invest in mortgage bonds and mortgage-backed  securities rather than engage in the
origination and servicing of housing loans.
A fuller appreciation of their investment needs and of their potential for
stimulating financial innovation would promote the development of efficient and liquid
markets for all kinds of long-term securities. A simplification of the complicated system
of taxation of financial institutions and instruments and greater boldness on the part of
both issuers  and investors would accelerate the process of development.
Occupational  pension funds in Mauritius have a satisfactory record of
performance.  They face many serious challenges that could transform their structure and
mode of operation.  But with the right policies regarding the extent of public provision of
pensions and the creation of robust regulation and effective  supervision, their role can be
expanded considerably with beneficial implications for financial sector development and
economic growth.
21ANNEX
lPubllic IP'rovision of IPensionsi
The public sector in Mauritius plays an important part in the direct provision of
pensions. It offers a universal  basic retirement pension to all elderly residents. This is
financed from general  tax revenues. It operates two compulsory schemes, the National
Pensions Fund that covers most private sector employees, and the National  Savings Fund
that covers most private and public sector employees (including civil servants). Both of
these schemes  accumulate long-term funds through regular contributions by employers
and employees.  And it operates the Civil Service Pension  Scheme, an unfunded  scheme
that is financed from general  tax revenues as part of the government budget.
Basic Retirement Pension (B]RP)
The BRP is a universal pension paid to all people aged over 60 years and financed
from general  taxes. Introduced  in  1951, the BRP amounts to 20% of the average  wage.
The benefit increases to 75% of the average wage for those between 90 and 100 years of
age and to 85%  for those over 100. This pillar reaches all poor households  and its cost
currently amounts  to 3.  1% of GDP (2000). But in view of rapid demographic  aging, the
cost of an unchanged BRP is projected by a recently completed World Bank report to
reach  5.9% of GDP by 2020 and  10.9% by 2050 (World Bank 2001).
The government  is considering various options for containing the cost of this
scheme. These essentially include raising the retirement age and introducing means tested
benefits.  Two variants of the means test are  under consideration:
o  a subsistence (or poverty) test that would include in the BRP only those
people with incomes or wealth  below specified levels; or
o  an affluence test that would exclude from the BRP those people with income
or wealth above specified levels.
Special emphasis is also placed on developing an efficient way of administering
the means test in order to both keep its costs down and improve its targeting
effectiveness.  According to estimates contained in the recently completed  World Bank
report, applying an affluence test with an increase in the retirement age to 65 would
contain the projected cost to 3.2 percent of GDP by 2020 and 4.5 percent by 2050.  A
combination  of the two tests, with gradual  benefit clawbacks,  is also under consideration.
National Pensions Fund (NPF)
The NPF is a contributory compulsory pillar that covers employees of private
sector firms. It was introduced in 1978 and is a defined benefit scheme operating on the
French point system. Almost all private-sector employees  are required to participate in
the NPF. Exceptions  include very low-paid workers  and those sugar-industry  workers
who, when the NPF was introduced, elected to remain within the already established
Sugar Industry Pension Funds (SIPF). Civil servants  and employees  of local-government
and statutory bodies are also exempt. Membership of the NPF stood in 2001  at 301,000
22out of a total workforce of a little over 500,000.  Beneficiaries are still less than 50,000,
resulting in a support ratio of over 6 active contributors per beneficiary. This is very
much in line  with the overall demographic  support ratio (Table Al). However, because of
aging, the support ratio is projected to fall to 2.5 by 2040. In 2000, there were a total of
454,000 people that had accumulated points in the system. This underscores the fact that
the ratio of active contributors to affiliated workers is not a good indicator of effective
coverage.
Table Al: Participating Employers, Employees  and Beneficiaries  of the NPF (end June)
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Employers  15,100  15,200  15,400  15,400  15,100
Employees  242,000  265,000  287,000  301,000  301,000
Beneficiaries  37,945  40,201  43,031  45,719  48,035
Support Ratio  6.38  6.59  6.67  6.58  6.27
Source: NPF
Contributions  are paid by both employers and employees and amount respectively
to 6 and 3 percent for a total of 9 percent of covered earnings (for the sugar industry,
contributions  amount to 13.5 percent, 9 percent paid by employers and 4.5 percent by
employees). Contributions  are assessed on earnings once they exceed a Lower Earnings
Limit but subject to an Upper Earnings Limit. The LEL and UEL are adjusted every other
year.
Contributions result in the accumulation of points on the basis of the declared cost
of a point at the time of contribution, while pension benefits depend on the accumulated
points and the declared  value of a point at the time of retirement. The cost and value of
points have been set a ratio of close to  11  to 1, implying an annuity conversion factor of
9.09 percent (Table A2). The ratio was initially set at 10.8 to 1 and may have been
influenced by the life expectancy  at retirement that was probably close to 11 years in
1978 when the NPF was introduced. The ratio was increased above 11 in the early 1980s
and reached 12.45 in 1982-but has been kept close to 11 since  1984.
In a world with no inflation and wage growth, contributions at 9 percent per year
for 40 years  would accumulate total balances  equal to 360 percent of covered annual
earnings.  At a conversion factor of 9.09 percent, these would produce a pension equal to
just below 33 percent of covered pre-retirement earnings.
Initially, the cost and value of a point lagged inflation by a significant margin
(Table A3). As a result,  the real level of the cost and value of a point fell to 75 percent of
the original level. However,  since  1989 the cost and value of a point have been  adjusted
in line with price inflation. The lower and upper earnings ceilings and the value of
pensions in payment have also been adjusted in line with price inflation (see paragraphs
1.6, 2.4 and 5.5 of the last actuarial review of the NPF completed by the GAD in
December 2001).
23Table A2: Operating Fealtures of NPF
(Contsributions,  Benefits, Cost and Value of Points, Lower and Upper Earnings Limits)
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Contributions  (MUR mn)  774  846  893  984  1055
Contnbutions (% GDP)  0.88  0.85  0.83  0.83  0.80
Benefits  (MIUR mn)  175  214  245  282  315
Benefits (%  GDP)  0.20  0.21  0.23  0.24  0.24
Lower Earnings Limit (MUR)  612  699  699  800  800
Upper Earnings Limit (MUR)  4,625  5,100  5,100  5,535  5,535
Cost of Point (MUR)  43.72  46.54  50.10  52.66
Value of Point (MUR)  3.99  4.23  4.55  4.80
Ratio of Cost to  Value  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0
Source:  NPF
Table A3: Evolution of the Cost and Value of Points, 1978-2000
Year  Inflation  Inflation  Cost  CoP  Value  VoP  CoP  VoP  CoP/
Index  of Point  Index  of Point  Index  UnderInd  Underlnd  VoP
1978-79  10.80  1.00  10.80
1979-80  33.0%  1.3300  12.53  1.1602  1.10  1.1000  0.8723  0.8271  11.39
1980-81  26.5%  1.6825  13.91  1.2880  1.16  1.1600  0.7655  0.6895  11.99
1981-82  13.4%  1.9079  16.06  1.4870  1.29  1.2900  0.7794  0.6761  12.45
1982-83  7.5%  2.0510  17.35  1.6065  1.49  1.4900  0.7833  0.7265  11.64
1983-84  5.6%  2.1658  17.70  1.6389  1.61  1.6100  0.7567  0.7434  10.99
1984-85  8.3%  2.3456  18.15  1.6806  1.64  1.6400  0.7165  0.6992  11.07
1985-86  4.3%  2.4465  18.69  1.7306  1.68  1.6800  0.7074  0.6867  11.13
1986-87  0.7%  2.4636  19.25  1.7824  1.73  1.7300  0.7235  0.7022  11.13
1987-88  1.5%  2.5006  21.18  1.9611  1.96  1.9600  0.7843  0.7838  10.81
1988-89  16.0%  2.9006  23.76  2.2000  2.16  2.1600  0.7585  0.7447  11.00
1989-90  10.7%  3.2110  26.18  2.4241  2.38  2.3800  0.7549  0.7412  11.00
1990-91  12.8%  3.6220  28.80  2.6667  2.62  2.6200  0.7362  0.7234  10.99
1991-92  2.9%  3.7271  30.24  2.8000  2.75  2.7500  0.7513  0.7378  11.00
1992-93  8.9%  4.0588  32.96  3.0519  3.00  3.0000  0.7519  0.7391  10.99
1993-94  9.4%  4.4403  36.09  3.3417  3.29  3.2900  0.7526  0.7409  10.97
1994-95  6.1%  4.7111  38.33  3.5491  3.49  3.4900  0.7533  0.7408  10.98
1995-96  5.8%  4.9844  40.48  3.7481  3.69  3.6900  0.7520  0.7403  10.97
1996-97  7.9%  5.3782  43.72  4.0481  3.99  3.9900  0.7527  0.7419  10.96
1997-98  5.4%  5.6686  46.34  4.2907  4.23  4.2300  0.7569  0.7462  10.96
1998-99  7.9%  6.1164  50.10  4.6389  4.55  4.5500  0.7584  0.7439  11.01
1999-00  5.3%  6.4406  52.66  4.8759  4.80  4.8000  0.7571  0.7453  10.97
Source: NPF
24But with positive real wage growth,  the resulting pensions have been a lower
percentage of pre-retirement earnings. The above mentioned World Bank report
estimated that the replacement  rate of full-career average-wage  workers amounted to only
26 percent  in 1998/99.  In a fully mature system and on a continuation  of past indexation
practice,  the replacement rate would fall to 12.5 percent.14
The ceiling on covered earnings,  the Upper Earnings Limit,  was initially set at a
very high level (175 percent of average earnings). However,  its level has been allowed to
fall over time and presently  it amounts to 80 percent  of average earnings. This has left
more scope for the development of occupational pension schemes.  It can be argued that
the original level of the ceiling was unduly high and that failure to index it has resulted in
an economically more appropriate level. In fact, the level of the ceiling should be kept
relatively low, no more than 120 percent of average  earnings, if occupational  pension
schemes are  to be encouraged to play a more active part in the Mauritian pension  system.
Alternatively,  the ceiling on contributions  and benefits could be reset at its original level,
but employers operating approved occupational  pension schemes could be allowed to
contract out of the NPF.
The Lower Earnings  Limit has also fallen  over time in relative terms from its
original level of 25 percent of average earnings to about 11.5 percent in 2001.  This fall
has widened the number of covered workers. However,  in the presence of the BRP, it is
arguably an unwelcome development  since it may be forcing low-income people to over-
save and have pension income in retirement  that exceeds their income in active life. It is
also raising the cost of hiring unskilled workers and may thus contribute  to the rise in
unemployment.  A policy of maintaining constant the relative level of the lower and upper
earnings limits would be advisable.15
The NPF has been established under the National Pensions Act and is
administered by the Minister of Social Security, who  also appoints a 13-member National
Pensions Board, which has an advisory role on all policy issues relating to national
pensions. Eight  NPB members represent employers  and employees,  equally divided
between the sugar and non-sugar sectors, while five represent the Ministries of Finance,
Health, Labor and Social Security (2). The private sector appointments  are made on terms
and conditions determined by the Minister. The NPF is required to undertake  an actuarial
valuation at intervals  of not more than five years and to publish audited annual  accounts.
14  UJnder the provisions of the NPF scheme, the pension points of members who were over age 40 in 1978
(and  so retired before  1998)  were doubled,  while for members  who were aged  between 20 and 40 in  1978
(and thus due to retire over the 20 years from 1998)  their pension points are increased  on a pro-rata basis as
if they have  been contributing for 40 years. It can be argued that failure to implement full wage indexation
has enabled the NPF to finance the doubling of benefits  to the first generation of workers. However,  this
has adverse implications  for the replacement rates of the subsequent generations.
15  Switzerland applies  a lower and upper earnings limit in connection  with its compulsory second pillar.
These  limits were initially set at the more reasonable  levels of 40 and 120 percent  of average  eamrings
(when the second pillar was introduced in 1985)  and they have been held constant relative to average
earnings  since then (Queisser and Vittas 2000). Switzerland  has also applied a minimum conversion
annuity factor of 7.2 percent in its compulsory  second pillar,  aiming for a replacement rate of 36 percent.  It
was recently forced to lower  the conversion annuity factor to 6.8 percent, because of lower investment
retw-ns and  increased longevity.
25The last actuarial review was conducted by the Government Actuary's Department
(GAD) of the  United Kingdom in 2001  (GAD 2001a).
There are no legally imposed investment limits on the assets of the NPF, but a 9-
member Investment Committee, comprising for the most part senior civil servants,  sets
the investment objectives and guidelines  of the NPF, including limits on investments.  The
Investment Committee includes among its membership a trade union and an employer
representative,  but its majority consists of ministerial representatives.  A member of the
NPB is represented on the Investment Committee  and may transmit advice from the
Board. However,  the Investment Committee has ultimate authority and responsibility for
the determination of investment policy and the investment process. Currently, the
following limits are applied  (Table A4).
As it can be seen, the investment limits are eminently reasonable.  Unlike so many
other developing countries,  there are no minimum investment requirements in
government securities or any other assets,  while the limits on international investments
are reasonably high. However, there are no upper limits on holdings of treasury bills and
as shown by the data in the preceding table, actual  asset allocations deviate considerably
from the levels that would  be compatible  with optimal risk diversification.  The NPF, like
other public sector institutions, is a major investor in large state-owned companies (such
as the SBM, SICOM, and Mauritius Telecom) as well as the numerous state investment
funds.
Table A4: Investment Limits of the NIPF
Type of Asset  Percent of Assets
Government stocks (bonds)  50
Treasury bills  100
Housing sector loans  20
Loans to Mauritius Housing Corporation  15*
Loans to Development Bank of Mauritius  15
Loans to local authonties, per case  MUR 25 million
Loans  to other organizations  10
Investments  in the Stock Exchange of Mauritius  10
International investments  25
* included  in overall housing  loan limit
Source: NPF
The NPF has accumulated significant financial resources. These amounted to
MNUR  21.8 billion in June 2001, corresponding  to  17 percent of GDP. NPF assets grew by
an average annual compound rate of over 15 percent between June 1996 and June 2001.
NPF assets have been invested prudently  and have generated a reasonably high and stable
real rate of retum. However,  the efficiency  of asset management could be further
enhanced  by judicious diversification  in company shares and foreign assets.  Government
securities,  including all types of bonds and treasury bills, absorbed 58 percent  of total
assets in 2001, up from 49 percent in 1997 (Table A5).
In contrast,  foreign  assets fell from  13 percent in 1998 to 4 percent in 2001. It is
not clear what prompted the relatively large fall in the holdings of foreign assets. Some
market sources suggest that it was linked to a decline in official  reserves  and a request to
the NPF to repatriate  some of its foreign assets. This would imply a less than arm's
26length relationship between the government and the asset management of the NPF.
Investment performance did benefit, however, from the fortuitous fall  in the share of
foreign assets  since the NPF has avoided the large losses suffered by foreign stock
marlcets in recent years.
Holdings of treasury bills have increased significantly  in recent years. These tend
to have a two-year term, but even so their growth implies a rise in reverse maturity
transformation:  the long-term resources of the NPF are invested in relatively short-term
assets.
Table A5: Asset Allocation  of National Pensions Fund (end June)
Percent of total assets  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Fixed Assets  4.4  3.7  3.1  2.7  2.1
Govemment Securities  (Market Value)  32.7  32.1  26.3  25.1  26.4
Independence  & Republic Bonds  9.8  8.4  7.2  5.3
Treasury Bills  6.7  10.0  25.3  23.5  32.0
All Government Securities  49.2  50.5  58.8  53.9  58.4
Listed shares  4.1  3.1  2.8  2.7  3.4
Unlisted shares  5.7  4.9  4.5  3.9  3.4
Listed debentures  0.2  5.4  4.8  4.2  0.3
Bank deposits  8.8  6.0  8.1  9.9  11.0
Foreign Investment  11.4  13.3  5.0  4.6  4.4
Loans (Various Institutions)  3.7  3.1  2.7  4.6  4.9
Loans (M.H.C)  9.4  7.5  6.0  7.6  7.7
Current Assets  3.2  2.7  4.1  5.9  4.5
Total Assets  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Total Assets (MUR million)  12,174  14,266  16,464  18,899  21,771
Total Assets (% of GDP)  13.78  14.28  15.33  15.95  16.56
Source:  NPF
The operating performance  of the NPF is reasonably efficient,  with low operating
costs and high investment returns (Table A6). Total operating expenses, which include all
administrative  expenses plus depreciation  allowances  and provisions for bad debts and
cover all the operations of the NPF including those relating to the administration  of the
BRP, have been on a declining trend. In 2001, they amounted to 9.2 percent of
contributions or 48 basis points of average total assets. This performance  is superior to
that of the average private sector pension fund for that year.
Table A6: Operating Performance of NPF (year ending in June)
(percent)  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Operating Expenses/Contributions  11.42  11.20  10.05  11.52  9.22
Operating Expenses/Average  Assets  0.79  0.72  0.58  0.64  0.48
Investment Income/Average  Assets  10.00  14.26  10.57  10.56  11.16
Benefits/Contributions  22.6  25.2  27.5  28.7  29.8
Benefits/Total  Inflows  9.2  7.8  9.8  9.9  9.5
Investment Income/Total  Inflows  59.1  69.0  64.5  65.5  68.3
Growth Rate of Total Assets  19.1  17.2  15.4  14.8  15.2
Source: Estimated  on the basis of NPF data.
27The NPF reports relatively small contribution  arrears. These amount to less than
0.25 percent of average  assets. In 2000, there was a large provision for bad debts of the
order of 2 percent of contributions or 0.11 percent of assets but in most other years such
provisions are very low, absorbing less than 0.01 percent of assets. In conjunction  with a
system support ratio of contributors to pensioners that is close to that of the population as
a whole, this implies an effectively  operated system with little evasion.
Investment income, which probably excludes unrealized capital  gains, fluctuated
between  10 and 14.3 percent in the period between fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 2001,
averaging  11.3 percent.  This compares with an average inflation rate of 6.2 percent over
the same period, implying a real rate of return of 4.8 percent. Investment  income
represents  a growing share of total inflows, amounting to 68 percent in 2001. This is a
reflection of the growing size of total assets. Benefits absorb an increasing share of
contributions,  having reached nearly 30 percent in 2001, but at less than 10 percent they
are low as a share of total inflows.
The investment perfornance of the NPF has been analyzed in the recent actuarial
review that was conducted by GAD. Table A7, which is extracted from this review,
shows the average nominal investment return of the NPF to have amounted to 11.3
percent over the 1990s. Except for  1998, this showed remarkable stability. Price inflation
averaged 7.2 percent over the same period, implying a real investment return of 3.8
percent.'6 As nominal earnings grew by an annual average of 10.3 percent or at real rate
of 2.9 percent,  the real investment return of the NPF exceeded real earnings growth by
almost 1 percentage  point. This performance is reasonable but not impressive by
international  standards. Pension funds in some high income countries have earned much
higher real returns relative to real wage growth over the  1990s, although it remains to be
seen whether such stellar performance  can be sustained over long periods.
Table  A7: Rates of investmnent return, price increases and earnings increases
Year  Rate of  return  Price  increases  Earnings
ending 30 June  increases
1991  11.1%  12.8%  15.0%
1992  11.2%  2.9%  8.7%
1993  11.8%  8.9%  6.8%
1994  9.9%  9.4%  17.3%
1995  10.3%  6.1%  11.4%
1996  11.2%  5.8%  7.0%
1997  10.4%  7.9%  11.0%
1998  15.2%  5.4%  8.0%
1999  10.9%  7.9%  8.6%
2000  10.9%  5.3%  8.8%
Average  11.3%  7.2%  10.3%
Source: GAD 2001a.
16  The returns reported by the GAD review are slightly higher than those shown in Table A5, probably
because they are calculated on the basis of investment assets alone, whereas Table A5 is based on total
assets.
28The financial performance of the NPF is generally  satisfactory by comparison  to
public pension funds in most developing countries.  While its operating cost ratios are
higher than those of the national provident funds of Singapore and Malaysia (reflecting
among other things the greater economies of scale enjoyed by the much larger
Singaporean  and Malaysian funds), its assets are  better diversified than such funds in
Malaysia, Singapore,  Sri Lanka and most other developing countries in the region. Public
pension funds in developing countries are often required to invest preponderantly in non-
traded government securities, a feature that is absent in Mauritius. The real investment
retums of the NPF have been higher than those of most public pension funds, including
the national provident funds of Singapore and Sri Lanka (though not Malaysia,  where the
Employees'  Provident Fund has achieved comparable real returns).
This satisfactory financial performance of the NPF over the 1990s was marred by
the discovery  in February 2003 of a fraud that had been ongoing for five years and
involved a time deposit of MUR 500 million with the Mauritius  Commercial Bank
(MCB), the largest and oldest commercial  bank in the country. The NPF accounts are
audited by the Director of Audits, but usually with a lag of at least two years. This
incident underscores the importance of commissioning  external audits by private
intemational firms as well as the need to strengthen internal audit and control systems.
Despite its satisfactory financial performance, the NPF faces two major
challenges.  First, there is a need for greater diversification of assets in non-government
securities  as well as in foreign assets. The NPF has selected one foreign asset manager
after a competitive bidding process, but it should consider awarding mandates  to one or
two additional foreign asset managers to lessen its total reliance on the investment advice
and performance  of only one manager. Relations with the extemal manager and all
intemational investments are effected through the Treasury Foreign Currency
Management  Fund (TFCMF),  a unit that appears to be a relic of the times when exchange
controls were imposed on capital flows. The TFCMF is clearly redundant  and its role
should be re-examined with a view to its elimination.
Investing a greater proportion of assets in local company shares and debentures
and perhaps  also in mortgage bonds or mortgage-backed  securities would require the
creation of a more transparent,  professional and independent  fund governance  and asset
management structure. Such a change in fund governance would be necessary to reassure
private sector companies  that increased holdings of company shares by the NPF would
not result in increased influence of the state in company management.  When state
institutions become major holders of company shares, there is always the risk or fear of
effective "nationalization through  the back door".
With appropriate changes in its membership  to reflect the changing structure of
the economy (for example representation of the sugar industry should be reduced)  and
ensure presence of professional experts, the National Pensions Board could be
transformed into an independent Board of Trustees of the NPF. It could become its
governing body with a direct role in managing its affairs and proper accountability to the
Minister and the Assembly.
29In this context,  the role and functions  of the Investment Committee should also be
changed.  It should have a majority of private sector members with high professional
expertise, including Certified Financial Analysts  (CFAs) and other professionals,  and
should report and be accountable  to the Board of Trustees.  Both the Board of Trustees
and the Investment Committee should be issued with clear mandates and should be
insulated from political interference by the establishment of safeguards along the lines
recently adopted in Canada and Ireland.
The second challenge is to enhance the transparency of its operations  and simplify
the link between contributions  and benefits.  The authorities are considering  a move from
the opaque point system, that has not worked very well, to a defined contribution  system
with individual capitalization  accounts and crediting of net investment returns  to
workers'  accounts.  On retirement, workers could use their accumulated balances for
purchasing a real annuity from the NPF, that would reflect the market-determined  term
structure of interest rates  and life expectancy  at retirement.  But they could also be given
the option to adopt a program of scheduled withdrawals,  with the monthly payment
determined once a year on the basis of remaining life expectancy,  or buying an annuity
from a private insurance company.
To protect workers  from the volatility of financial market returns, the NPF could
also develop and offer products that aim at protecting the principal  value of workers'
contributions,  either in nominal or in real terms. Such products would need to be
carefully priced to avoid the creation of distorted incentives that could cause trouble in
the longer run.
Any changes in the structure and operations of the NPF would need to be studied
carefully and implemented cautiously.  Pension systems involve very long-term  contracts
spanning more than sixty years and have far-reaching social, economic  and financial
implications.  Protecting the interests  of workers is of paramount  importance.  However, it
is also essential to ensure that the NPF continues to operate  efficiently and does not grow
so much that it ends up by dominating the local financial  system. One option for avoiding
the latter risk would be to allow private sector employers  who establish well-run and
transparent pension funds to be exempt from participating in the NPF. Effectively,  this
would involve extending to such private sector employers the exemption  already enjoyed
by the various statutory bodies.  An even more prornising option would be to give
individual  workers the right to choose between the NPF and the pension fund established
by their employer.
Several  operational features  of the NPF depend on decisions regarding  the overall
structure of the pension system. For instance, the question of whether the ceiling on
contributions  should be restored to its original level is indicative of the complexity and
inter-relatedness  of pension issues. If the NPF were to be converted to a DC plan and a
contracting-out option given to employers  and employees,  then restoration  and even
elimination of the ceiling could be desirable. But if the NPF were to continue as a
compulsory DB plan without any contracting-out option, then restoration of the ceiling to
its original level would not be advisable.  This is because a high ceiling would
substantially restrict the scope for occupational pension schemes while  also resulting in
30much higher contributions  and a much larger NPF,  increasing the risk of market
domination by a state-run institution.  Similar considerations  argue against an increase in
the contribution rate (the current low level of payroll taxes is an attractive feature of the
Mauritian pension system).  Rather than increasing payroll taxes, a better alternative
would be to lower the level of promised benefits to a more realistic  level, increase the
normal retirement age, or enhance further the investment performance of the NPF.
However, given the continuation  of a reformed and affordable BRP, a better alternative
would be to convert the NPF to a DC scheme and allow contracting out to both
employers and employees.
National Savings Fund (NSF)
The NSF is a defined-contribution  scheme that offers workers  a lump sum on
retirement. It started operating in 1994/5  and had an estimated 340,000 participating
workers in 2001  (Table A8). All employees are required to participate  in the NSF,
including civil  servants and employees of statutory bodies. However, contributions are
assessed on earnings above  the lower earnings limit that applies to NPF contributions  and
thus low-paid workers are not covered.  As in the case of the NPF, contributions  are not
assessed on earnings that exceed the upper earnings limit. The contrnbution rate amounts
to 2.5 percent of covered earnings and is paid by employers.
Benefits are given in the form of lump sums on normal or early retirement. Lump
sums are equal to the contributions  made in individual  accounts plus credited interest
income. According to the wording of the relevant act, employees are entitled to receive as
a minimum the total nominal value of their contributions.  This implies a guarantee that
the accumulated lifetime interest income will not be negative. Operating costs are
covered by an administrative  charge that cannot exceed 2.5 percent of contributions  and
is deducted from investment income. An actuarial review of the NSF was  also carried out
by GAD in 2001  (GAD 2001b).
Table A8: NSF: Participating Workers and Financial Data (1997-2001)
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Employees  (OOOs)  313  316  306  336  340
Contributions  (MTJR  million)  282  305  306  375  389
Assets (MUR million)  948  1366  1825  2385  2849
Assets (% GDP)  1.07  1.37  1.70  2.01  2.17
Source: NSF
The NSF accumulated resources  amounting to MUR 2.8 billion in June 2001 (2.2
percent of GDP). The largest part of assets (82 percent) is invested in government
securities (18 percent in government bonds and 64 percent in treasury bills). 6 percent is
placed in bank deposits and  10 percent is lent to various organizations,  mostly to the
Mauritius Housing  Corporation. The conservative investment portfolio is partly linked to
the offer of the nominal  guarantee but it also reflects  a strong preference  for government
paper and other public sector securities.  The NSF, like other public sector institutions,
invests in the various  state companies and investment funds.
31The NSF does not play a major part either as a pension fund or as a financial
institution. Rather than developing  a separate infrastructure  to enhance its efficiency and
direct its investments toward the private sector, a more promising alternative would be to
merge its activities into the reformed NPF, when the latter is converted into a defined-
contribution  system.
The Civfil Service Pension Scheme (CSPS)
The last component of public provision of pensions covers the CSPS. This is often
characterized  as overly generous in comparison to the benefits offered by the NPF. This
is because it is a non-contributory  scheme that offers a pension equal to two-thirds of the
salary of the last month of employment after 400 months of service (33.3 years).
Moreover,  pensions are indexed to same rank earnings (this is a major element of cost
that, together with the use of the salary of the last month of employment, exposes the
CSPS to huge outlays, especially toward senior civil servants who benefit from large
promotions  at the end of their active careers).  In contrast, the NPF is contributory and
promises  a one-third replacement rate of covered earnings after 480 months of service
(40 years). As noted, indexation  of the cost and value of points to prices rather than
earnings has lowered the effective replacement  rate of the NPF to 26 percent at this
juncture and to a projected  12.5 percent when it reaches full maturity. Moreover, NPF
benefits are at most adjusted for price inflation.
However, this characterization,  though accurate,  is incomplete. The CSPS is both
a general and a supplementary  occupational scheme.  Though still more generous, its
benefits are not overly so by comparison to occupational  pension schemes operated by
large private sector employers.  (The benefits of the pension  schemes operated by various
statutory bodies are similar in structure to those of the CSPS.)  Private sector schemes
also offer a two-thirds pension based on the last salary but after 480 months of service.
Pensions in payment benefit from ad hoc adjustments to compensate for inflation but they
are not linked to same rank earnings. In fact, tax regulations limit annual increases in
private sector pension payments to no more than  3 percent. Thus, private sector pensions
suffer a significant erosion of their real value over time. Nevertheless,  the CSPS should
be seen as part of the total remuneration package of civil servants. It may compensate  for
a lower level of remuneration  during their active life by comparison to employees of
17 large private sector companies'  .
Like most defined benefit schemes anywhere in the world, retiring civil servants
are entitled to commute to a tax-free lump sum up to 25 percent of their pension. The
capital sum is equal to  12.5 times the converted amount of the pension. The same benefit
is extended to members of the schemes of statutory bodies and private companies  and the
same limit and formula are applied to them.18 While use of a fixed formula,  irrespective
17  Civil servants have other unorthodox benefits ostensibly to compensate them for their allegedly low
salaries. For example, they are entitled to purchase duty-free  cars every four years and to retain any gains
made in selling their old cars in the second-hand market.  Senior civil  servants also derive considerable
benefits from serving on various committees and boards.
18  Local experts indicate that in the prnvate sector the commutation factor is often significantly  lower,
taking into account mortality experience, interest rates, and intended pension increases.
32of life expectancy and prevailing level of interest rates, is open to criticism, the multiple
of 12.5 is not generous.
Because of progressive aging of the covered population,  the cost of the CSPS is
projected to increase from its current level of 20 percent of the total salaries bill to 30
percent in 15  years time and 50 percent by 2050.  At that time, benefits paid could
correspond to between 3 and 3.5 percent of GDP.  The civil service  scheme has 50,000
active members and about 30,000 beneficiaries.  (Local government schemes that are
similar in structure cover about 5,000 employees.)
The CSPS faces several critical policy issues. The first concerns  the establishment
of an appropriate  basis and level of funding in order to protect benefits from future
budgetary pressures. The second is a need to harmonize its terms and conditions  with
those offered by private sector entities in order to facilitate labor mobility between the
civil service and the private sector. However, in addressing these challenges it is
important to examine the whole compensation package of civil servants to ensure that the
civil service continues to be able to attract, train and retain high caliber staff.
Nevertheless  some aspects of the scheme that tend to distort incentives and cause large
increases  in expenditures (such  as continuing use of the last salary for calculating
pensions, early retirement with generous benefits,  and indexation to same rank earnings)
would need to be revisited.
As in many other countries around the world, one feasible reform option would be
to create  a defined-contribution  scheme for new recruits to the civil service, while
continuing the defined-benefit  scheme for existing civil servants. A DC scheme would be
both funded and fully portable  and would not pose any obstacles to labor mobility.
Establishing a fund to cover the actuarial liabilities of the existing scheme would pose a
much greater challenge, given the large size of these liabilities  (already estimated at 33
percent of GDP) and the budgetary pressures currently faced by the public sector.
Moreover, a fund that is not invested in non-government  securities would be of little
value.  It might therefore be advisable to continue with the current policy of unfunded
benefits for existing civil servants, at least for as long as budgetary pressures persist.
Over time, a buffer fund could be created to cover part of the unfunded liabilities,
depending on the budgetary  situation.  But the difficulty of funding a previously unfunded
but mature system should strengthen the argument for creating a fully funded DC scheme
for new staff.
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